St. Thomas Law Review
First Page
309
Document Type
Article
Abstract
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (the Act or RICO). The stated purpose of the Act was to attack organized crime by providing both criminal and civil remedies in order to detach crime organizations, such as the Mafia, from various legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, such as labor unions. While RICO has been an effective weapon for the Justice Department in fighting organized crime, it has disrupted the labor-management relationship. While once disputes were resolved by a swift punch in the nose, the provisions mandating treble damages and attorney's fees now allow the parties to bring loaded guns into a school yard fight. The issue is not whether RICO is abused. The issue is whether it places into the hands of both management and labor a weapon which each can use against the other to upset the tenuous balance of power that is the hallmark of labor-management relations. This article does not challenge the propriety of government initiated lawsuits under the Act. However, this article does seek to question whether private parties should intitiate RICO suits in the context of labor relations disputes. The ability of private parties to initiate these suits with regard to labor relations disputes, may insert a wild card into the balance of power between unions and managements. This is true even in lawsuits that will ultimately be unsuccessful. Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the RICO Act and part III analyzes certain aspects of the RICO Act in relation to labor-management relations. Finally, the conclusion asserts that Congress should remove the ability of private parties to bring RICO suits in labor-management disputes.
Recommended Citation
Raymond P. Green,
The Application of RICO to Labor-Management and Employment Disputes,
7
St. Thomas L. Rev.
309
(1995).
Available at:
https://scholarship.stu.edu/stlr/vol7/iss2/4