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St. Thomas Law Review

James B. Miller

First Page

393

Document Type

Note

Abstract

This Note argues that Congress has statutorily overturned City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.'s holding of "rational basis" review for the disabled, through its enactment of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990. The argument focuses upon the fact that the United States Supreme Court affords Congress substantial deference in both its fact-finding capacity and in its lawmaking capacity in constitutional matters, especially in the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This Note will distinguish Heller v. Doe by arguing that although it was a proper decision, the Court failed to state that the correct standard of review as applied to the disabled was strict scrutiny. This Note also argues that Congress has determined that the disabled are members of a suspect class and are therefore entitled to strict scrutiny review. This is based upon the findings that Congress placed in the ADA, and the fact that these findings were placed in a code provision thereby entitling them to the effect of law; and, that a suspect class receives strict scrutiny review under the Court's prior decisions. This Note, in Part I, provides a mini-summary of "suspect," "quasi-suspect", and "non-suspect" classifications as determined by the Court in applying the proper constitutional standard of review to legislative or other official acts. This Note will also introduce, in Part I, the term "suspect class" and list the common indicia, which the Court uses to determine if a particular class is "suspect." Part II(A) will focus on the importance of fact-finding in constitutional interpretation. Part II(B) will discuss the deference that the Court has historically given to Congress as a finder of fact. Part III will proceed to touch upon the separation of powers doctrine. Subsection (A) focuses upon the scope of Congress' powers as defined by the Court (especially under the Fourteenth Amendment). Subsection (B) addresses the fact that the Court has acknowledged Congress' power to create laws that have overturned prior Supreme Court decisions, and the rule that an intervening law must be applied unless it would result in a manifest injustice. Part IV(A) of this Note briefly discusses Cleburne and the Court's reasoning in applying rational basis review to the disabled (here, the mentally retarded); and the Court's "punt" to Congress on the determination of which standard of review to apply to this particular class. Part IV(B)(1) of this Note discusses the ADA, and specifically Congress' findings as set forth in the ADA. Part IV(B)(2) argues that Congress has repudiated Cleburne's factual reasonings, and thus, its holding, and has declared that the disabled are a suspect class. Part IV(B)(3) of this Note follows up on this analysis with the argument that Congress, upon determining that the disabled are a suspect class, has also determined that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for this class of citizens. The arguments in both Parts IV(B)(1) and (2) are primarily based upon Congress' determination that, both factually and statutorily, the Court did not "find" the correct facts when it made its decision in Cleburne. Part IV(C) of this Note focuses on what is deemed to be the "non-holding" of Heller: rational basis standard of review for the disabled. Heller's application of rational basis review was a non-holding for two reasons: (1) the Court rejected any form of heightened scrutiny for the disabled in that case because of the fact that the issue regarding the standard of review was not properly certified for review; and (2) the Court specifically stated that another standard of review may have been applicable. Finally, Part V of this Note concludes that Congress has determined, both factually and statutorily, that the disabled are members of a suspect class, and therefore, the strict scrutiny standard of review must be applied because of deference to Congress in its fact-finding capacity and in the exercise of its plenary powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in enacting legislation to protect a suspect class' rights under the Equal Protection Clause.

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