St. Thomas Law Review
First Page
23
Document Type
Article
Abstract
This Article argues that Florida courts got it wrong. Part II of this Article reviews the chronological evolution of Florida's anti-discrimination law. It then contrasts Florida courts' reading of the FCRA to extend age-related protections only to individuals over forty to the Commission's unyielding argument for the Act's age-neutral application. This Part further illustrates this interpretative incongruity by juxtaposing the Fourth District Court of Appeal's holding in City of Hollywood v. Hogan to the Commission's final order in Williams v. Sailorman, Inc. Part III of this Article reviews the Commission on Human Relations' role enforcing the FCRA and describes the two enforcement avenues-judicial and administrative-the Florida Legislature inscribed into the Act. This Part posits that the courts' analysis of the FCRA's age protections de facto eliminates the judicial enforcement mechanism from the Act. Part IV of this Article expands on this argument by engaging in statutory interpretation. This Part reasons that, on its face, the FCRA is unambiguous, and the statutory language must be given its plain and obvious meaning. In the alternative, it reasons, the FCRA should not be interpreted in the image of the ADEA because such interpretation is not "harmonious with the spirit of the Florida legislation." This Part explains that the "harmony" cannot be achieved for four reasons: (1) the 1977 legislative record of the FCRA (then-Human Rights Act) does not only not express the intent to set a lower age ceiling-it in fact expresses a contrary intent; (2) the Florida Legislature provided all aggrieved persons with two enforcement routes and did not intend to exclude anyone from the FCRA's all-inclusive statutory framework; (3) the courts' reading controverts the Act's "manifest purpose" to provide Floridians with the maximum protection against unlawful discrimination in employment; and finally, (4) the Florida Legislature knows how to express its intent that a state statute follow the federal law, and intentionally omitted such expression from the FCRA with respect to "age discrimination." Part V of this Article discusses two out-of-state case analogs-Michigan's Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Services Corp. and New Jersey's Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, in which state courts overturned their prior precedents, declining to follow the ADEA's lower age ceiling, and held that their states' respective anti-discrimination statutes, similar to Florida's, protected individuals of all ages. This Article concludes with Part VI, which offers final thoughts on the Florida courts' and the FCHR's interpretive "disconnect," and provides suggestions to the Florida courts, the Florida Legislature, and the Commission on how to reconcile their differences.
Recommended Citation
Viktoryia Johnson,
Adults Only: Florida's Botched Case of Youth Employment Discrimination,
29
St. Thomas L. Rev.
23
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarship.stu.edu/stlr/vol29/iss1/3