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St. Thomas Law Review

First Page

293

Document Type

Article

Abstract

In my original article, I examined Miranda's historical and social background, discussed its precursors, traced the evolution of the case, and documented the dismantling of the Miranda doctrine. I also argued that the doctrine's "seductive appeal" lulled defense counsel into a false sense of security, thereby deflecting reliance on the "voluntariness" standard as a failsafe to Miranda. Further, I maintained that a waiver of Miranda in some instances served to sanitize an otherwise involuntary confession. Finally, I proposed to "do away" with Miranda, to return to the voluntariness standard with one caveat: that the government be precluded from relying on a Miranda waiver to establish the voluntariness of a confession. With the benefit of hindsight, I suppose my arguments and conclusions, however prosaic, have stood the test of time. Indeed, it seems in retrospect that most scholars have arrived at the same place. Therefore, I hope to elaborate on the piece by focusing, in Part I, on a couple of cases which illustrate the U.S. Supreme Court's ratification of deception as an integral part of interrogations, despite Miranda's admonitions. Then, in Part II, I will juxtapose those earlier cases with the Court's latest pronouncements on Miranda, which reflect the virtual dismantling of the doctrine. In Part III, I will focus on a case that, though based on the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, threatens to turn Miranda on its head. The Conclusion provides a revision of my proposal to return to the voluntariness standard by focusing on factors that will provide better guidance to lower courts in assessing the putative "voluntariness" of a confession.

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